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 ABSTRACT 
 The benefi ts theory of tax fairness was the dominant approach to tax justice 
until the late nineteenth century. This paper examines the reasons for the rejec-
tion of the benefi ts principle in the nineteenth century and the evolution of 
benefi ts theory in the twentieth century in response to this criticism. It uses 
this historical inquiry as a launching point for re-evaluation of the prospects 
for benefi ts theory. Benefi ts taxation has a number of advantages. As an ethi-
cal claim, it appeals to intuitive principles of fair cooperation. As a rule of 
procedural justice, it tends to protect against oppressive tax schemes. Although 
benefi ts theory has the resources to respond to some of the most historically 
infl uential criticisms, it faces additional challenges. These include specifying the 
baseline against which benefi ts are to be measured and fair treatment of taxpay-
ers who take a public-spirited view of government spending as opposed to those 
who are mainly concerned with their private advantages. 
 INTRODUCTION 
 BENEFITS THEORIES OF tax fairness evaluate tax burdens in light of the benefits received by the taxpayer from the state. The underlying idea is that of reciprocity: a fair taxation scheme is one in which taxes owed by 
a taxpayer bear the proper relationship to the benefits that the taxpayer receives 
from the state. This account of tax fairness was popular until at least the 
nineteenth century, but has fallen out of favour since John Stuart Mill ’ s critique 
in  Principles of  Political Economy, 1 to the extent that it is barely mentioned 
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in treatments of tax policy by leading contemporary economists. 2 Its place in 
most discussions of taxation in contemporary legal theory is typically modest 
at best. 3 
 This paper examines the history of this fall from favour and the response of 
benefi ts theorists. The benefi ts principle is amenable to two signifi cantly differ-
ent interpretations. One version of the benefi ts principle holds that taxpayers 
should pay taxes set in proportion to the benefi ts that they receive from the 
state. This classical version of the benefi ts principle was dominant until the 
nineteenth century. A second version of the benefi ts principle holds that each 
taxpayer should receive benefi ts that are suffi cient to compensate them for 
the taxes that they pay. This modern approach to benefi ts taxation developed 
alongside modern economic analysis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and responded to some of the criticisms of the classical principle. This 
paper will reassess the prospects for benefi ts theories of tax fairness against 
the backdrop of this history. The verdict will be mixed. Benefi ts taxation has 
a number of advantages. As an ethical claim, it appeals to intuitive principles 
of fair cooperation. As a rule of procedural justice, it tends to protect against 
oppressive tax schemes as well as against more mundane wasteful spending. 
Moreover, the original reasons for its rejection in the late nineteenth century 
were not necessarily well justifi ed. Nevertheless, benefi ts taxation faces diffi -
cult challenges in determining the baseline against which benefi ts are to be 
measured and in reconciling the perspectives of taxpayers who value public 
goods for different reasons. 
 This paper will fi rst situate benefi ts theories of tax fairness within the range 
of possible approaches to tax fairness. It next explores the history of debates 
over the benefi ts principle and examines why the reputation of the benefi ts 
principle went into decline in the late nineteenth century. Third, it describes 
the emergence of a modern approach to benefi ts taxation based on advances in 
economic analysis. Fourth, it considers various arguments for each version of 
the benefi ts principle and how defenders of benefi ts taxation might respond to 
historically infl uential objections. Finally, it introduces two new problems for 
benefi ts taxation and examines some of the potential responses. 
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 TAX FAIRNESS 
 There are three basic approaches that are commonly taken to tax fairness. One 
might order them in terms of the information required to evaluate tax fairness 
from least to most demanding. The simplest approach, and probably the most 
common in contemporary tax theory, analyses fairness in terms of relative abil-
ity to pay. Following John Stuart Mill, this is sometimes glossed as equality of 
sacrifi ce, which Mill argued meant that every taxpayer should feel  ‘ no more and 
no less inconvenience from his payments than every other person experiences 
from his. ’ 4 Proponents of this approach usually favour taxation by reference to 
the taxpayer ’ s income, wealth, or consumption, depending on which they believe 
to be the best proxy for ability to pay. Early proponents of the  ‘ ability to pay ’ 
theory such as Mill tended to favour fl at tax rates, but progressive taxation has 
become more popular in the past century. 
 The subject of this paper is a second approach to tax fairness, which 
compares tax burdens to the benefi ts received from government spending. This 
 ‘ benefi ts ’ theory holds that taxes ought to be set in relation to the benefi ts 
that the taxpayer receives from the state. Assessing tax fairness in these terms 
requires knowledge not only of the economic position of the taxpayer but also 
of the impact of public spending on taxpayers. Evaluation of taxation in light 
of benefi ts to the taxpayer therefore requires more information than  ‘ ability to 
pay ’ theories do. Like ability to pay theories, benefi ts theories of tax fairness 
are compatible with a range of policies. For example, proponents might favour 
taxation in proportion to income, wealth or consumption, according to whether 
income, property or consumption taxes is the best proxy for benefi ts received 
from the state. Alternatively, defenders of the benefi ts principle might favour 
policies that aim to match benefi ts from government with the burdens of taxa-
tion in a manner tailored to the circumstances of individual taxpayers. 
 A third approach to tax fairness is to analyse taxation in light of a broader 
theory of distributive justice. This approach is the most demanding in terms 
of the information required to evaluate tax fairness as it typically requires 
knowledge not only of taxpayers ’ economic standing and the effects of public 
spending but also of further facts relevant to whether the distribution of wealth 
is just. Such a theory might be an egalitarian theory of distributive justice, such 
as that advanced by John Rawls. 5 Or it might be a consequentialist theory such 
as utilitarianism. 6 Of course, there is heated debate within both the egalitarian 
and the utilitarian camps over the implications of these theories for tax policy. 
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What both types of theories have in common is that tax fairness cannot be 
analysed in isolation from the entire scheme of property rights and government 
benefi ts and must be derived in light of these facts from more abstract principles 
of distributive justice. For egalitarians and utilitarians, there is nothing norma-
tively distinctive about taxation and tax fairness is simply a matter of applying 
generally applicable normative principles to questions of tax policy. 7 
 This third approach is not necessarily mutually exclusive of the fi rst two. 
One might endorse some comprehensive egalitarian or utilitarian theory of 
distributive justice as the ultimate justifi cation of tax policy, while arguing 
that either the ability to pay principle or the benefi ts principle is the best way 
to implement this theory. For example, a utilitarian might argue that taxa-
tion in proportion to ability to pay is the best policy in light of uncertainty in 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. Similarly, a utilitarian could argue that 
aligning tax obligations with benefi ts derived from public spending is prefer-
able, on the basis of greater effi ciency. Egalitarians might likewise adopt a 
system of taxation based on ability to pay in light of their larger theoretical 
commitments. For example, John Rawls favoured a system of proportionate 
taxation on all income above a personal allowance. 8 But this policy would 
exist against a background of property entitlements and government spending 
policies that would allow for relatively egalitarian outcomes without progres-
sive taxation. 9 The key difference between this approach and the fi rst two is 
that proponents of comprehensive theories of distributive justice adopt rules 
of tax fairness as outputs of their larger theories of distributive justice and 
not as freestanding principles. In this paper, I will mainly consider freestand-
ing arguments for benefi ts taxation, some of which might be integrated into a 
larger consequentialist framework. 
 CLASSICAL AND MODERN BENEFITS TAXATION 
 Following Richard Musgrave, I will distinguish between two strains of benefi ts 
theory. 10 The classical theory, which predominated until the nineteenth century, 
treated contribution in proportion to benefi ts received from the state as the 
basic norm of tax fairness. Modern benefi ts theory, which developed in the late 
 nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, evaluated taxes in terms of the willing-
ness to pay for public goods of each taxpayer, but does not necessarily require 
taxation in proportion to personal benefi t. 
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 Classical Benefi ts Theory 
 The classical benefi t principle was the leading approach to tax fairness from the 
early modern period into the nineteenth century. It was defended by Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Sir William Petty, Hobbes, Turgot, Mirabeau, Montesquieu, Senior 
and Thiers, among others. 11 American economist Henry Carter Adams described 
the benefi ts theory as  ‘ [t]he idea  … that, insomuch as individuals receive benefi ts 
from the state, a payment should be made on account of and in proportion 
to these benefi ts. ’ 12 Proponents of benefi ts taxation such as Thiers sometimes 
compared taxes to insurance premiums levied in proportion to the wealth that 
the taxpayer has under the state ’ s protection. 13 Early classical benefi ts theorists 
were mainly concerned with apportioning tax burdens to fi nance basic public 
goods such as the military and the legal system. Edwin Seligman, an opponent 
of the classical view, explained,  ‘ Since protection was generally regarded as the 
chief function of the state, the conclusion was drawn that taxes must be adjusted 
to the protection afforded. ’ 14 
 Although benefi ts theory is a rival of the  ‘ ability to pay ’ theory, the two 
approaches might have similar implications if one makes plausible assumptions 
about the relationship between property ownership and benefi ts from the state. 
If the main function of the state is the protection of property, then it makes 
sense to allocate tax burdens in proportion to property holdings. Most theo-
rists, therefore, favoured a form of proportionate taxation. For example, Adam 
Smith stated as his fi rst maxim of taxation that  ‘ The subjects of every state 
ought to contribute to the support of the government, as nearly as possible 
in proportion to their respective abilities: that is, in proportion to the revenue 
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. ’ 15 Smith drew an 
analogy between citizens of a nation and joint tenants in a common enterprise 
who contribute in proportion to their interests in the enterprise. 16 It is worth 
noting that in Smith ’ s time, taxes roughly proportionate to income or wealth 
were the exception rather than the rule. Using them to replace the patchwork 
of tariffs, fees and duties would make public fi nance less arbitrary and quite 
possibly less regressive. 17 Both the benefi ts theory and the ability to pay theory 
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would therefore count as progressive when compared with the status quo and 
promise to produce a fairer distribution of burdens among taxpayers of similar 
economic station. 
 Since the benefi ts received by taxpayers are not directly measurable, one 
must use some proxy for benefi ts in order to determine tax obligations. Potential 
proxies include consumption, property holdings and income. Thomas Hobbes, 
for example, favoured a consumption tax on the grounds that subjects should 
contribute taxes in proportion to the benefi ts they receive from the state and 
that these benefi ts are roughly proportional to their expenses. 18 Persons who 
save rather than consume their income leave resources to be enjoyed by other 
citizens and thus should be taxed only on that increment of income which they 
consume. Thiers, by contrast, appealed to the benefi ts principle to argue that 
income from both labour and property should be taxed, since both property 
owners and workers benefi ted from the protection of the state. 19 
 Late Nineteenth-Century Critiques of  Benefi ts Theory 
 Classical benefi ts theory went into decline by the late nineteenth century. It was 
rejected by leading fi gures in Britain such as John Stuart Mill and in Germany 
such as Adolph Wagner. 20 Nineteenth-century critics identifi ed three major 
challenges. First, the diffi culty of measuring the benefi ts of public goods might 
undermine the benefi ts principle. Mill charged the benefi ts theory with  ‘ setting 
defi nitive values on things essentially indefi nite ’ by trying to attach precise fi gures 
to the benefi ts taxpayers receive from government. 21 Generally speaking, there 
are two ways in which one might try to estimate the value of public services for 
taxpayers. Henry Carter Adams helpfully labelled these the  ‘ purchase theory ’ of 
taxation and the  ‘ benefi t theory ’ . 22 The chief difference, as Adams puts it, is that 
the fi rst  ‘ regards a tax from the point of view of cost to the state, the other from 
the point of view of advantage to the citizen ’ . 23 In other words, the purchase 
theory compares tax burdens to the cost of services a taxpayer receives from 
the state whereas the benefi ts theory compares tax burdens to the value that a 
taxpayer places on services received from the state. The former approach has 
the advantage of beginning with concrete data such as fi gures on public spend-
ing from the state budget. However, it is diffi cult to apportion tax obligations 
between citizens on this basis. The principle that each taxpayer should bear their 
share of the actual cost of providing services does not seem to determine whether 
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the cost of services should be divided equally among taxpayers, in proportion 
to income, in proportion to property holdings, in proportion to consumption, 
or on the basis of some other metric. The basic problem is that most public 
goods are subject to diminishing marginal costs as one provides services to addi-
tional taxpayers. 24 Allocating tax burdens according to the marginal cost of 
each taxpayer will therefore not yield enough revenue to support the provision 
of these public goods. Once we set aside marginal cost, there does not seem to 
be any way to divide tax obligations between citizens in a way that is internal to 
the logic of the theory. One might try to allocate fi xed costs in proportion to the 
marginal cost of providing services to each taxpayer. In most cases, the results 
will be that citizens will share in the costs in rough proportion to their economic 
standing. This version of the benefi t principle therefore tends to collapse into a 
regressive version of  ‘ ability to pay ’ theory. 
 In addition to the diffi culties of using cost to the state to determine tax 
burdens, there is a principled reason for instead measuring benefi ts in terms of 
willingness to pay. Measurement in terms of cost to the state allows the possibility 
that some taxpayers ’ tax burdens will exceed their valuation of public services. 
This is especially plausible for taxpayers with little money and therefore a high 
marginal utility of income. For example, it may be perfectly rational to prefer 
having enough to eat and shelter for the night to paying one ’ s share of the cost 
of police services. Benefi ts as measured by cost to the state could tend, therefore, 
toward a confl ictual relationship between state and taxpayer. Measurement in 
terms of willingness to pay has the opposite effect. If a tax is set in proportion 
to willingness to pay for government services, any given taxpayer is very likely to 
benefi t, net, from government, unless taxes are extremely high or public services 
are of very poor quality. Willingness to pay as a measurement of benefi ts, there-
fore, tends to consensual fi scal policy and a cooperative mode of politics in which 
taxpayers divide the surplus made possible by effective government. 
 Despite these advantages, in the heyday of the classical benefi ts principle, 
the willingness to pay approach was not very promising. There is no market for 
public goods such as national defence or the legal system and thus no market 
prices for them. Asking taxpayers how much they value services would be a futile 
exercise since, even if taxpayers could give accurate answers, there would be 
strong incentives to underestimate. Although one might assume for the purpose 
of simplifi cation that all taxpayers of a particular class have similar tastes, and 
tax them accordingly, this assumption is unrealistic and, in any case, causes the 
benefi ts principle to collapse into an ability to pay theory. 
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 A second diffi culty is that the classical benefi ts principle might be thought 
to have undesirable distributive consequences. To the extent that the state 
protects persons as well as property, this might suggest that taxes should 
combine a per capita charge with a tax proportionate to property holdings, 
which would yield a quite regressive overall rate structure. 25 Mill argued that, 
when taken to its logical conclusion, the benefi ts principle suggests regressive 
taxation because those who, without the protection of the state, would be 
oppressed by the wealthy and powerful would seem to enjoy disproportion-
ate benefi ts. 26 In practice, proponents of the classical benefi ts principle are 
more likely to favour proportionate taxation than regressive taxation. Either 
interpretation of the benefi ts principle was unpalatable for most progressives. 
Late nineteenth-century advocates of progressive taxation in the United States 
such as Edwin Seligman, Richard Ely and Henry Carter Adams attacked the 
benefi ts principle as obsolete and inadequate to the needs of the modern fi scal 
state. 27 In part, their criticism was motivated by the perceived incompatibility 
of the benefi ts principle with progressive taxation. They urged acceptance of 
ability to pay theories of tax fairness as being more adequate to the circum-
stances of the modern progressive state. This tendency grew even stronger as 
income taxation became the primary mode of public fi nance in most devel-
oped countries and public spending became focused to a much greater extent 
on the social welfare state. 
 A third criticism of the benefi ts principle was that it rested on too limited 
a conception of the nature of government. John Stuart Mill argued,  ‘ Govern-
ment must be regarded as so pre-eminently a concern of all, that to determine 
who are most interested in it is of no real importance. ’ 28 The range of projects 
undertaken by modern states makes the classical model seem inadequate. As 
Mill observed,  ‘ it is not admissible that the protection of persons and that of 
property are the sole purposes of government. The ends of government are as 
comprehensive as those of the social union. ’ 29 One cannot, therefore assume 
that taxpayers benefi t from the state in proportion to the protection afforded 
to their persons and property. Some defenders of progressive taxation took a 
more extreme position. For example, Seligman argued that  ‘ we pay taxes not 
because the state protects us, or because we get any benefi ts from the state, but 
simply because the state is a part of us. The duty of supporting and protecting 
it is born with us. In a civilised society, it is as necessary to the individual as the 
air he breathes. ’ 30 
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 This third line of criticism is diffi cult to assess. The observation that the 
activities of the state extend beyond personal protection does not entail that 
personal benefi t is inapt as a criterion for apportioning tax obligations. Instead, 
one might look at the full range of advantages that a citizen obtains from the 
state. Mill ’ s larger point, that government is a public rather than a private 
concern, is weightier. One might think that citizens should relate to their collec-
tive obligations as citizens in a way that differs fundamentally from their role 
as private consumers. Although fair terms of exchange might be a central value 
in the second sort of relation, this may not be the right way to think about the 
fi rst sort of relation. Seligman ’ s comments, on the other hand, seem to press the 
point too far. From the other side of the unhappy history of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism, his argument seems muddled at best. 
 Modern Benefi ts Theory 
 Ironically, just as the benefi ts principle was being eclipsed in the mainstream of 
tax theory, innovations in economic analysis provided a new approach to benefi ts 
taxation that addressed some of the traditional objections. The modern benefi ts 
principle holds that a tax is fair if benefi ts received from the state adequately 
compensate the taxpayer for the burdens of taxation. This new approach to 
benefi ts taxation is grounded in economic analysis and models public fi nance 
as an exchange between the state and taxpayers. Modern benefi ts theory can 
be traced to the work of Knut Wicksell and was further developed by Erik 
Lindahl. 31 Wicksell ’ s basic insight was that requiring unanimous consent rule 
for each spending project and the taxes needed to fund it could both solve the 
problem of measuring private valuations of public goods and guarantee that 
each taxpayer receives public services that she values at least as much as the taxes 
that she pays. The unanimous consent rule allows each taxpayer to veto projects 
that do not provide adequate compensation. Conversely, taxpayers who value a 
particular public good highly should be willing to pay higher taxes to support 
it, even if some of their fellow citizens decline to support it fi nancially. Negotia-
tion in the shadow of a unanimous consent rule thus creates something like a 
market for public goods. Of course, securing unanimous agreement outside of 
very small collectives is virtually impossible in practice. Some people are irra-
tional. Others might hold out for strategic reasons, making negotiations unduly 
cumbersome. For this reason, the unanimous consent rule would need to be 
relaxed to some degree in practice. I will not explore the practicalities of imple-
menting Wicksell taxation in any detail, but instead evaluate Wicksell taxation 
as a normative standard for tax fairness. 
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 The modern approach to benefi ts taxation differs signifi cantly from the clas-
sical approach. The classical benefi ts principle states that tax obligations should 
be assigned in proportion to the benefi ts the taxpayer receives from government. 
The classical principle thus looks to the total benefi t received by a taxpayer and 
compares this to the total benefi t received by another taxpayer. The modern 
benefi ts principle requires that every taxpayer should receive benefi ts from the 
state that they value more than the income that they sacrifi ce in tax. Modern 
benefi ts taxation accomplishes this by looking to the marginal value of taxes 
paid by each taxpayer since, if every taxpayer fi nds each increment of taxation 
worthwhile in terms of the services that they receive, every taxpayer will be 
made better off, net, by the fi scal system. In short, the classical principle looks to 
total benefi t, while the modern principle looks to marginal benefi t. Whereas the 
classical principle requires a particular relation between the taxes paid by each 
taxpayer, the modern principle is consistent with taxpayers who receive similar 
benefi ts owing substantially different amounts of tax so long as each taxpayer 
is adequately compensated by a package of public services that she values more 
than the foregone revenue. The classical principle, on the other hand, gives no 
assurance that a given taxpayer will prefer the combined package of government 
services and taxes offered by the state. At high enough levels of taxation, some 
taxpayers may be made worse off by government. The modern principle, by 
contrast, ensures that fi scal exchange represents a net gain for every taxpayer. 
 Wicksell taxation represents an ingenious scheme for achieving effi ciencies 
in the provision of public goods. For goods with increasing marginal costs and 
decreasing marginal benefi ts, an effi cient level of production is reached where 
marginal cost equals marginal benefi t. At this point, the next unit produced will 
cost more than it is worth, while the previous unit is worth more than it costs 
to produce. It is thus not rational to either increase or to decrease production. 
A competitive market in the production and sale of private goods will reach 
this equilibrium. Standard microeconomic theory suggests that this analysis 
does not apply to public goods because public goods are non-excludable and 
non-rival. In other words, one cannot sell individual citizens national defence, 
because it is not possible to defend a nation ’ s territory without thereby protect-
ing those who live in it. And unlike private goods, one citizen ’ s enjoyment of 
military protection does not diminish that of any other citizen. An omniscient 
policymaker could simply set public goods provision and taxes to support them 
at an effi cient level, but actual policymakers have no way to do so without a 
market in public goods. Wicksell ’ s scheme uses the unanimous consent rule as 
a way to reveal information about taxpayers ’ valuations of public goods and 
exclude policies that make some taxpayers worse off. Wicksell taxation produces 
an effi cient outcome in the provision of public goods by allowing any party or 
group of parties that values the public good at above marginal cost to assume 
the cost of producing it by offering to pay the additional taxes necessary to 
produce the good. Other taxpayers should not object even if they do not care at 
all about the public good, so long as they are not asked to make any additional 
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contributions. Wicksell taxation thus allows taxpayers to reach an effi cient equi-
librium in which all taxpayers fund exactly as much public good production as 
they fi nd cost-justifi ed. 
 The classical benefi ts principle can claim no such advantage. Requiring 
taxpayers pay taxes in proportion to the benefi ts that they receive in return 
does not entail that these benefi ts exceed the net value of taxes paid to support 
them. Conversely, the classical principle permits but does not require schemes in 
which taxpayers who prefer additional supply of a particular public good pay 
additional taxes to support it. Although the classical principle does not require 
economically effi cient taxation, supporters of the classical principle might argue 
that aligning tax obligations with benefi ts received reduces the likelihood that 
one faction will fund public goods that it prefers, while shifting the tax burden 
onto others. If those who benefi t the most from a service bear the greatest 
burden, it is more likely that taxpayers will set the provision of public services at 
roughly the effi cient level. And unlike the modern benefi ts principle, the classi-
cal principle is consistent with a range of decision procedures and so allows for 
more fl exibility in institutional design. 
 In addition to Wicksell taxation, two other strategies for aligning tax 
burdens with benefi ts from public spending are worth noting. One alterna-
tive to Wicksell ’ s unanimity rule is jurisdictional competition. The American 
economist Charles Tiebout argued that effi cient provision of local public goods 
can be achieved by delegating tax policy and public goods provision to local 
governments, thus allowing taxpayers to choose jurisdictions on the basis of 
which package of taxes and services they prefer. 32 Funding local public goods 
such as police, parks and libraries out of local property taxes links the benefi ts 
and burdens of taxation, since the value of high-quality public services tends to 
be capitalised into real estate prices. Citizens who prefer low taxes and sparse 
services can select a low-tax jurisdiction, while citizens who prefer high taxes and 
lavish public services can select a high-tax jurisdiction. Jurisdictional competi-
tion goes part-way to achieving the results of Wicksell taxation without the need 
for negotiation between citizens. In addition, one might think that local resi-
dents are best positioned to monitor the quality of local public goods and adjust 
their support for taxation in light of the quality of local public administration. 
Of course, Tieboutian competition works only in certain institutional settings 
and only for certain public goods. Signifi cant power over taxing and spending 
decisions must be delegated to political entities that cover suffi ciently small terri-
tories that a given worker might reasonably choose between living in a number 
of different jurisdictions. Such schemes are most practicable in nations such as 
the United States and Switzerland with a strong tradition of local government 
and a large number of well-paid workers. Where these conditions are not met, 
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jurisdictional competition may allow mobile taxpayers to displace tax burdens 
on those who cannot move between jurisdictions. 
 A third means of aligning benefi ts and burdens is funding programmes out of 
dedicated taxes that fall mainly on those who benefi t from the programme. This 
might be done by restricting public services to those who have paid the relevant 
tax, or by funding a service out of a tax that is targeted at those likely to make 
use of the service. Contributory social insurance schemes that condition benefi ts 
on prior tax payments are examples of the fi rst strategy. Taxation of vehicles 
and petrol to support road maintenance is an example of the second. The fi rst 
approach is preferable from the perspective of linking burdens and benefi ts, but 
is only effective for excludable goods. The second requires that the tax imposed 
is a good proxy for use of the service. This is somewhat rare for public goods. 
 Response to the Nineteenth-Century Critique 
 The traditional argument against the benefi ts principle, that benefi ts to the 
taxpayer are impossible to measure, is a serious problem for the classical bene-
fi ts principle. It is less threatening to the modern approach to benefi ts taxation, 
which identifi es a number of ways to analyse willingness to pay. The technical 
challenges for proponents of the modern benefi ts taxation, although consider-
able, are less than those faced by utilitarian analysis, which has had renewed 
popularity in the twentieth century. For cases in which these technical diffi culties 
prevent a more fi ne-grained approach to taxation, it is always open to the bene-
fi ts theorist to use consumption, income or wealth as a proxy for the benefi ts 
received from public spending. This might yield policies that are similar to some 
versions of taxation based on ability to pay, but would rest on a very different 
normative foundation. 
 The modern benefi ts principle does not provide an explicit response to objec-
tions to the distributive consequences of benefi ts taxation. Proponents of the 
benefi ts principle have at least two plausible responses to the claim that benefi ts 
taxation leads to regressive policies. First, if one calculates benefi ts in terms 
of willingness to pay, the wealthy will tend to pay higher taxes for the same 
services. As a person gains more resources, she is willing to bid more for a given 
good or service because she has more resources left over to pursue other projects, 
and thus compares the good or service to relatively fewer valuable projects. 33 
Whereas a poor person might need to decide between larger public parks and a 
second bedroom, a rich person who owns a fi ve bedroom house might be decid-
ing between larger public parks and a sixth bedroom. If the two taxpayers have 
similar needs for living space, the wealthier person should be willing to sacrifi ce 
more to receive the same service than a poor person. Benefi ts taxation therefore 
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implies that the wealthy should pay more in taxes even when both rich and poor 
receive roughly the same services. When, as is often the case, local public goods 
increase the value of property holdings, this provides further reason to tax those 
with more property more than those with less. Because rich and poor are likely 
to value public goods in different ways, there is a danger that the wealthy and 
infl uential will succeed in enacting public spending on goods that they value 
and shifting part of the resulting tax burden onto the poor and powerless who 
would, on balance, prefer greater private consumption. Knut Wicksell was, in 
fact, concerned to prevent such outcomes. 34 When Wicksell was writing, in the 
last years of the nineteenth century, Sweden derived four-fi fths of its tax revenue 
from indirect taxes. 35 As Wicksell pointed out, the  ‘ whole legislative and tax 
approval machinery ’ rested  ‘ exclusively in the hands of the propertied classes. ’ 36 
The unanimous consent rule prevents the wealthy from imposing their prefer-
ences for lavish public spending on the poor, and encourages wealthier taxpayers 
to offer tax concessions or transfer payments to poorer citizens in order to 
buy their consent for spending projects that the wealthy prefer. Conservative 
Wicksellians, such as James Buchanan, concede that this is a foreseeable conse-
quence of Wicksell taxation. 37 
 Second, and perhaps more importantly, Wicksell taxation is conceived as a 
means to fi nance public goods and does not foreclose taxes that are levied for 
purely distributive reasons. This means that the benefi ts principle might be used 
to evaluate public fi nance and public spending  after one has instituted any poli-
cies calculated to achieve a fair distribution of initial resources. Adopting the 
benefi ts principle as the primary guide to fairness in taxation is consistent with 
a two-tier tax system in which one set of taxes is imposed to regulate wealth 
inequality, and a second layer of taxation, based on the benefi ts principle, is used 
to fi nance public goods. 38 John Rawls, in fact, endorses Wicksell taxation for the 
provision of public goods once other tax and transfer policies have ensured a 
fair distribution of resources between citizens. 39 In this way, purely distributive 
questions might be distinguished from questions about fi nancing public goods. 
Different taxes in the same fi scal system might serve different ends. Inherit-
ance taxes and a progressive income tax might be largely designed to achieve 
distributive aims, while any additional tax revenue needed for public goods and 
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social insurance might be derived from taxes that follow the logic of the benefi ts 
principle. 
 Supporters of the modern benefi ts principle might disagree about what sort 
of initial distribution is appropriate. Libertarians might argue that no such 
distribution is justifi ed, whereas Rawlsians and market socialists might argue 
that a highly redistributive tax and transfer scheme is required. This might 
involve taxing the wealthy to fund wage subsidies and welfare payments that 
provide poorer citizens with more ability to  ‘ purchase ’ public goods through the 
political process if they so choose. 40 On a theoretical level, this seems a perfectly 
adequate reply to the claim that benefi ts taxation is regressive. As a matter of 
practice, one might worry that it is not possible to maintain political support for 
redistributive measures without disguising them behind the veil of public goods 
provision. It is diffi cult to assess the signifi cance of this concern in the abstract, 
since its practical signifi cance depends on the features of particular political 
cultures. 
 Along with an over-emphasis on the regressive nature of benefi ts taxation, 
the redistributive character of ability-to-pay theories is sometimes oversold. 
Progressive taxation in proportion to income or wealth may mitigate inequity 
relative to proportionate taxation, but unless taxation reaches levels that amount 
to functional expropriation, there are considerable limits on the extent to which 
taxation alone can redress inequality of wealth. In order to do so, progressive 
taxation must be used to fi nance transfer payments. But in this case, public 
spending is doing much of the redistributive work. It is misleading, therefore, to 
identify ability to pay theories with egalitarianism when considering taxation to 
fund public goods as opposed to transfer payments. Modern benefi ts taxation 
requires linking taxation and public spending in a way that prevents sleight of 
hand in which taxes are justifi ed as support for collective projects and used for 
transfer payments. Clarity is, however, a theoretical virtue. Redistributive social 
programmes should be justifi ed directly as requirements of justice or of political 
prudence, and not concealed by severing the link between taxation and public 
spending on the one hand and effacing the distinction between public goods and 
transfer payments on the other. 
 In response to the point that benefi ts taxation misunderstands the proper 
relationship between state and citizen, proponents may argue that their theory 
promotes relations of freedom and equality. Wicksell suggested that,  ‘ Each 
member of society would be happy in the knowledge that the goods which taxa-
tion withdraws from his private use are destined solely for purposes which he 
recognizes to be useful and in which he has a genuine interest, be it for purely 
selfi sh or for altruistic motives. Surely this would do more than anything else to 
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awaken and maintain the spirit of good citizenship. ’ 41 More generally, Wicksell ’ s 
scheme aims to secure the freedom of each citizen to choose which public 
projects to support. Citizens must work together to fi nd policies that command 
general assent and attend to the interests of all. In this way, the proposal seems 
especially democratic in spirit. 
 Proponents of benefi ts taxation might in turn suggest that  ‘ ability to pay ’ 
theories encourage a myopic focus on tax policy in isolation from the larger fi scal 
system, and that optimal tax theory glosses over the effects on individuals by 
aggregating effects across taxpayers. The benefi ts theory of taxation, by contrast, 
is individualist in its approach to taxpayers, but synthetic in its treatment of the 
fi scal system. It is individualist in that it is focused on the treatment of individual 
taxpayers, as opposed to metrics such as social utility that aggregate across indi-
viduals. 42 This might be especially attractive to those looking for alternatives to 
utilitarian analysis, although it may also be acceptable to rule consequentialists 
such as Buchanan. Although attentive to the interests of individual taxpayers, bene-
fi ts taxation facilitates evaluation of the fi scal system as a whole by linking taxation 
and public services. This may provide grounds to justify or to criticise a tax as it 
focuses attention on both the benefi ts and the costs of particular policies. 43 Integra-
tion of tax burdens and public spending into a common analytical framework is a 
signifi cant advantage for the benefi ts theory in relation to  ‘ ability to pay ’ theories. 
 ADVANTAGES OF BENEFITS TAXATION 
 The benefi ts principle might be defended as a requirement of fair terms of coop-
eration between citizens or as a means of ensuring fair relations between the state 
and its citizens. The classical benefi ts principle is most obviously aimed at the fi rst 
notion of fairness, and the modern benefi ts principle at the second. However, both 
principles may be defended in either way. I will fi rst consider the benefi ts principle 
as a norm of fair distribution of tax burdens and then consider how the principle 
might be defended in terms of broader considerations of political economy. 
 Tax Fairness as Proportionality 
 The classical benefi ts principle is founded on an intuitive notion of fairness in 
exchange that is aimed at balancing the benefi ts and burdens of cooperation. 
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Contributions to the state refl ect the benefi ts that one receives in return. From 
those to whom much is given, much is expected, and those who receive little 
might be expected to contribute little in return. Fiscal exchange under the clas-
sical principle is not based on market pricing, but instead requires that tax 
obligations refl ect a taxpayer ’ s ordinal position in terms of benefi ts from the 
state, so that those who receive greater benefi ts bear greater burdens. Accord-
ing to this line of thought, the mark of an unfair tax system is one in which tax 
burdens are shifted onto those who benefi t less from the state. 
 As an archetype of unfair exchange, one might think of oppressed peasants 
who are forced to pay taxes to support a state that protects the rights and interests 
of landlords. 44 From the point of view of the peasants, it might be a matter of near 
indifference whether their present landlords are replaced by new landlords. That 
the peasants pay less in tax than their landlords would be little consolation, since 
the peasants receive almost nothing in return for their tax payments. By contrast, 
in a city in which citizens share broadly in the city ’ s prosperity, citizens might will-
ingly pay for protection and infrastructure. A fair tax system would be one in 
which the wealthier citizens paid more in tax since they benefi t more from the 
success of the city. But less affl uent citizens might also be expected to contribute 
something to common projects that produce common benefi ts. The citizens might 
face substantially higher taxes than the peasants, but because these taxes bring 
tangible benefi ts to each citizen and tax obligations are roughly calibrated to these 
benefi ts, the city ’ s tax system is seen as fair and legitimate. 
 In modern democratic societies, it may be more apt to think of the bene-
fi ts principle in terms of reciprocity between taxpayers (or at least prospective 
taxpayers) than in terms of exchange between taxpayers and the state. Taxpayers 
in a democratic society cooperate by contributing to the support of a government 
that provides public goods. They share in the benefi ts of public services and must 
decide how to apportion the burden of supporting these services. The benefi ts 
principle requires that fi scal exchange between taxpayers observes a norm of 
proportionality. Apportioning the burdens of cooperation in accordance with 
the benefi ts ensures that no one gains a disproportionate benefi t from the collec-
tive endeavour by gaining a large share of the benefi ts while bearing little of 
the burden. And it prevents the burdens from being borne disproportionately 
by those who do not benefi t. If the endeavour is successful (ie the government 
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produces net benefi ts for taxpayers), this success is broadly shared with bene-
fi ts spread across the population. And if the endeavour is less successful (ie the 
government costs more than the benefi ts it provides), these losses are also spread 
across the population. The provision of public goods under the classical benefi ts 
principle is thus aimed at providing proportionate advantages for all taxpayers, 
rather than at redistribution of advantages between taxpayers. 45 
 Under the classical benefi ts principle, cooperation in the creation of public 
goods is subject to similar norms of those which typically govern private partner-
ships. All partners have a right to a share in the benefi ts of the relationship, but the 
right to profi ts is proportional to contributions to the partnership. This rule has 
at least two main appeals. First, it appeals to the participants ’ sense of fairness. 46 
Second, it gives each partner an incentive to continue the relationship, rather than 
leaving for other ventures. In a world in which people can choose their partners 
in cooperative ventures, cooperative arrangements that do not allocate benefi ts in 
proportion to contributions will tend to see poorly compensated partners leave to 
join ventures in which all are treated equally (i.e. in proportion to their contribu-
tions). For this reason, voluntary cooperative endeavours will tend to adopt rules 
that spread benefi ts so as to give cooperators incentive to continue the relationship. 
The state is obviously not a voluntary cooperative endeavour. However, modern 
tax systems rely on a fair degree of compliance by the population. And democratic 
government functions better when there are common understandings about fair-
ness in taxation. For these reasons, it is not desirable for tax rules to diverge too 
much from citizens ’ sense of fair terms of cooperation between strangers. 
 An implication of this model of tax fairness is that non-tax contributions to 
common projects, such as military service, may substitute for tax obligations in 
the accounting of a citizen ’ s benefi ts and burdens. There is historical evidence 
that people sometimes do reason in this way. Political scientists Kenneth Scheve 
and David Stasavage have recently argued that high tax rates for the wealthy 
in the mid-twentieth century were in large part a response to mass conscrip-
tion during the First and Second World Wars. 47 Voters saw high taxes on the 
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wealthy as justifi ed in light of the sacrifi ces made by common people during 
the wars. Those who became wealthy while others gave their lives to protect 
the nation gained a special obligation to make substantial sacrifi ces for the 
public benefi t in order to offset the contributions made by ordinary citizens 
subject to mass conscription. 48 As memory of mass conscription faded, popular 
demand for high tax rates for the wealthy declined and the highest marginal 
rates drifted downward. 49 The logic of the classic benefi ts principle makes sense 
of this historical pattern in a way that ability to pay theories and egalitarian 
theories do not. Mass conscription during wartime disrupts the balance between 
benefi ts and burdens that were obtained during peacetime. This balance can 
only be restored by increasing progressive taxes on the wealthy to account 
for the increased contributions of other members of the public. If Scheve and 
Stasavage ’ s historical claims are correct, this is reason to think that the logic of 
the classic principle is deeply ingrained in popular sentiment. 
 If this analysis is correct, the classical benefi ts theory refl ects a notion of 
fairness in exchange that is continuous with pre-modern political organisation. 
It is probably not an accident that the classical benefi ts principle was the leading 
theory in the early modern era when the modern state was in an early phase of 
its development. In a world with little conception of a distinctive public sector, 
it is natural to apply rules about fair terms of cooperation between private indi-
viduals to relations between the state and the taxpayer. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that accounts of tax fairness in the early modern era tended to preserve 
some of the normative character of pre-modern social relations. Two contradic-
tory lessons might be drawn from this observation about the relationship of the 
classical benefi ts principle to non-state forms of exchange. On the one hand, 
one might conclude that the logic of the classical benefi ts principle preserves the 
normative character of private social relations, and is therefore inappropriate 
in the context of a modern state with a large professional administrative staff 
and an impersonal, law-governed relationship between state and citizen. As was 
discussed previously, this was an undercurrent of some of the criticisms of the 
classical principle in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, one might take 
the character of public fi nance in pre-modern states as having implications for 
the norms of human cooperation generally, and reason that cooperative endeav-
ours that conform to these norms are more likely to be successful. 50 The extent 
to which underlying norms of social cooperation differ across time and place is 
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a highly complex question. The extent to which people model tax fairness on 
broader cooperative norms is also uncertain. 51 A high level of certainty about 
either response is probably not warranted. 
 The case for the modern benefi ts principle in terms of fairness between 
taxpayers is somewhat weaker. This is because the unanimity rule grossly under-
determines the distribution of tax burdens for public goods that all agree should 
be funded. For example, all property owners are presumably willing to pay a 
signifi cant share of their income in order to support the minimum military and 
police services necessary to protect their property. These could be funded by 
a poll tax so that each taxpayer (except, perhaps, for the most destitute) pays 
the same sum. Or they might be funded exclusively from taxes on the wealthy. 
Neither arrangement would seem to violate the modern principle, since all 
citizens would rank both arrangements as superior to a world without police 
or military. It is consistent, therefore, with Wicksellian principles to require 
a relatively small number of taxpayers to pay for such services. The unanim-
ity rule therefore does little to distinguish between very different distributions 
of tax burdens to support public goods that all would agree to support  – the 
inframarginal public goods. Of course, it is unlikely that negotiations in the 
shadow of the unanimity rule would result in such extreme outcomes. But more 
plausible outcomes might differ greatly from one another along these lines. For 
this reason, it might be preferable to combine Wicksell taxation with rules that 
allocate taxes to support goods that everyone agrees upon  – the inframarginal 
taxes  – in ways similar to the classical benefi ts principle. This approach would 
ensure that the costs of essential services are not lumped onto any one subset 
of taxpayers. 
 Constraining the State 
 Although the classical principle might be better suited to provide an account 
of fair cooperation between citizens, the modern benefi ts principle appears 
more promising in giving an account of fair relations between citizens and the 
state. The modern benefi ts principle requires that each taxpayer receive benefi ts 
from the state that are at least as valuable as the taxes that they pay. This ensures 
that the state has a no worse than neutral net economic impact on every taxpayer. 
The modern benefi ts principle, therefore, might be seen as requiring that the 
exchange of taxes for public services be justifi able to each citizen. 
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 The modern benefi ts principle provides a plausible answer to the diffi cult 
problem of how to reconcile citizens ’ full-blooded entitlements to property and 
income with the state ’ s full-blooded authority to levy taxes. The diffi culty is in 
avoiding one of two extremes in formulating a principle of tax fairness. At one 
extreme is the rejection of any limits on taxes enacted through legitimate legal 
procedures. The problem with this view is that if there are no constraints on how 
tax obligations may be arranged, it seems that property entitlements and entitle-
ments to earn income from labour have little normative substance since the state 
has the power to effectively expropriate property holders through the tax system. 
All workers and all property owners earn at the sufferance of the state. Some 
may not fi nd this result particularly objectionable. 52 If the post-tax distribution of 
property rights is fair to each citizen, then perhaps it does not much matter how 
this result was achieved. As a matter of abstract moral principle, there is something 
to be said for this view. As a matter of what one might call political morality  – 
the background norms that structure political life in a polity  – it is less attractive. 
The other extreme is the position that all taxation is a prima facie violation of 
property rights because it expropriates part of the value of a property from the 
rightful owner. This would provide a limiting principle for taxation, but one that 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of all taxation, even taxes that fairly directly serve 
the interests of property owners. What is needed is some principle that allows a 
signifi cant range of tax policies but does not permit any tax whatsoever. 
 One possible role for the benefi ts principles is to provide such a happy medium. 
The classical principle and the modern principle do this in slightly different ways. 
The modern principle constrains the state by requiring that fi scal exchange be at 
worst neutral for every taxpayer. In effect this means that when the state taxes 
property owners, it provides them with services that compensate each prop-
erty owner enough to offset the losses from taxation. For example, a 5 per cent 
tax on the value of all land in a jurisdiction would reduce the fi nancial value of 
landholding. But if the tax revenue is used to protect the property rights of land-
owners, it is likely that the net effect of the tax will be to increase the value of the 
landowners ’ property rights. The same logic applies to local public goods such as 
roads, fi re departments, libraries, schools, and museums. Public goods that make 
an area more attractive to live in will tend to raise property values and so may 
compensate the property owner for tax payments. Thus, even a taxpayer who does 
not personally value the public good in question may benefi t, since public goods 
that appeal to a suffi cient number of prospective buyers will increase the market 
price of the taxpayer ’ s property. The modern benefi ts principle thus restricts fi scal 
outcomes to those that are broadly win-win, and thereby ensures that the state, on 
net, enhances the entitlements of taxpayers. 53 In such a system, taxation is fully 
consistent with robust property rights. 
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 The classical benefi ts principle negotiates the boundaries of legitimate taxa-
tion somewhat differently than the modern benefi ts principle does. In some 
ways it is more permissive, and in some ways more constraining. Whereas the 
modern benefi ts principle restricts fi scal policy to outcomes that are benefi cial 
for all taxpayers, the classical principle requires that the gains from coopera-
tion through the state be divided fairly between taxpayers. In other work, I have 
defended horizontal equity as a norm that prevents negative sum confl icts over 
distributive policy between similarly situated taxpayers. 54 The crux of the idea 
is that a horizontally equitable tax code is preferable to a patchwork of waste-
ful credits and deductions designed to benefi t some taxpayers at the expense 
of others. Horizontal equity thus constrains distributive confl icts between simi-
larly situated taxpayers while remaining neutral on the question of how much 
to spend on public goods and the question of whether to redistribute from rich 
to poor (or, less happily, from poor to rich). Horizontal equity, however, does 
nothing to constrain the level of taxation or prevent one economic class from 
expropriating or oppressing another. The benefi ts principle might be thought 
both to constrain differences in the treatment of similarly situated taxpayers 
and to require fair treatment of taxpayers who are differently situated. Observ-
ing rough proportionality in the distribution of benefi ts and burdens prevents 
the state from collecting taxes primarily from one group of taxpayers and using 
them to support public goods favoured by another group of taxpayers. In this 
respect, the classical benefi ts principle has an advantage over horizontal equity, at 
least when considering taxation to support public goods as opposed to transfer 
payments. This observation also provides reason to prefer the classical princi-
ple to the modern principle. Although the modern principle prevents the state 
from imposing policies that are negative sum for any taxpayer, it is consistent 
with policies that concentrate the benefi ts of public goods disproportionately 
among only a few taxpayers. The classical principle, by contrast, is concerned 
with apportioning gains from cooperation fairly, so that those who receive simi-
lar benefi ts pay similar tax. 
 The Jurisdictional Role of  the Benefi ts Principle 
 A fi nal role played by the benefi ts principle is jurisdictional. Rather than using 
the benefi ts principle to determine tax obligations, one might appeal to the 
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benefi ts principle to determine who should be liable for taxation in a given juris-
diction. This idea is embedded in the modern system of international taxation, 
but pre-dates it. For example, the nineteenth-century American lawyer Thomas 
Cooley argued that  ‘ The protection of the government being the considera-
tion for which taxes are demanded, all parties who receive or are entitled to 
that protection may be called upon to render the equivalent. The protection 
may be either to the rights of persons or to rights in property and taxes may 
consequently be imposed when either person or property is within the jurisdic-
tion. ’ 55 Delineating the right to tax is diffi cult when economic activity crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries. One also might use benefi ts logic to determine how 
to allocate the right to tax the corporate profi ts of a multinational that operates 
across international boundaries. 56 It is fair that foreign investors who benefi t 
from the public goods provided by states in which they invest pay to support 
the provision of these goods. One problem with international tax competition 
is that it threatens to deprive capital importing nations of tax revenue, since 
states with little bargaining power may be compelled to offer tax concessions 
if they wish to attract capital in an environment in which competitors offer tax 
incentives for foreign investors. 57 Similarly, one might justify taxation of foreign 
nationals on the basis of residence by reference to their enjoyment of public 
goods provided by the host state. 58 Whether to tax a nation ’ s citizens who live 
abroad depends in part on judgments about the extent to which expatriates 
benefi t from public goods provided by the state, including the goods that will be 
enjoyed by an expatriate who returns home. Although  ‘ benefi ts theory ’ logic is 
perhaps least controversial in the area of international taxation, tracing out its 
implications for international tax policy is immensely complicated, and cannot 
be accomplished within the scope of this paper. 
 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE BENEFITS PRINCIPLE 
 The Baseline Problem 
 As was argued above, proponents of benefi ts taxation have plausible responses 
to the claim that benefi ts taxation has objectionable distributive implications. 
However, the problem of redistribution points to a deeper concern with the 
benefi ts principle. This I will call the baseline problem. The baseline problem is 
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that benefi ts of a particular public good must be measured against the state of 
affairs in which the good is not provided. This creates both normative and posi-
tive challenges. In some cases, the appropriate baseline is relatively clear. The 
value of a public park to a taxpayer is the difference between how the taxpayer 
values a neighbourhood with the park and the same neighbourhood without the 
park. Although it may not be possible to measure private valuations of the park 
directly because it is uneconomical to charge admission and because some bene-
fi ts may accrue to those who do not enter the park, it is possible to determine 
implicit valuations by looking at the market for property located near the park. 
Goods that have a more pervasive effect on the taxpayer ’ s quality of life can be 
more diffi cult to value. What, for example, is the value of the legal system to a 
taxpayer ? One could imagine a simple agricultural economy in which disputes 
are resolved by a combination of self-help, informal mediation, and community 
discussion. But it is diffi cult to imagine a complex economy that functions well 
without a specialised dispute resolution system backed by specialised enforcers. 
Lack of a formal legal system would both sharply diminish the economic value 
of property rights and signifi cantly compromise personal security. 
 If one adopts the theory that benefi t is to be measured in terms of willing-
ness to pay, then one must consider the alternative to lack of protection from 
the state and how much the taxpayer would be willing to pay to avoid this state 
of affairs. But this seems to depend on what the taxpayer ’ s situation would be 
outside of the state. Would the taxpayer own the same property ? Or would there 
be a free-for-all such that the taxpayer could expect to end up with much less 
property. For taxpayers having valuable skills, one might consider the market 
for their labour abroad when considering their willingness-to-pay for protection 
by the state. But for other assets, one might wonder whether one is to suppose 
that patterns of ownership are to remain the same outside the protection of the 
state. If so, this seems a rather artifi cial assumption that will undervalue public 
spending given that the purported benefi t of taxes is the protection of property. 
But if not, it seems quite plausible that a taxpayer would be willing to pay a 
very large proportion of income in order to protect her property. The modern 
benefi ts principle would therefore place only very mild constraints on the taxa-
tion of wealthy taxpayers (the poor being much quicker to conclude that taxes 
are not worthwhile since they are closer to their expected outcome in the state 
of nature). 
 With respect to protection of persons, the problem is even worse. Taxpay-
ers would presumably be willing to pay a very large sum for protection of their 
persons. But in this case, willingness to pay will give little guidance on how to 
allocate tax burdens. Benefi ts theorists have two options at this point. One is 
to rely on the classical benefi ts principle, which might suggest that if taxpay-
ers benefi t equally from protection to their persons, they should share the 
costs of providing this protection equally. This response is plausible, but might 
raise objections on distributive grounds. A second, perhaps more promising, 
approach is that taken by James Buchanan. This is to separate constitutional 
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negotiations, which fi x the political order, property entitlements and the legal 
system (the  ‘ protective state ’ ), from the provision of other public goods (the 
 ‘ productive state ’ ). 59 The constitutional contract thus fi xes the baseline against 
which negotiation over ordinary taxing and spending decisions take place. This 
has the advantage of determining a background against which fi scal policy can 
be evaluated. But it may incorporate a bias toward non-redistributive policies 
since separating the protective state from the productive state as Buchanan 
does, limits the extent to which the benefi ts that the wealthy receive from the 
protective state can be used to justify greater contributions to the public goods 
produced by the productive state. On the other hand, the justifi cation of the 
protective state might require signifi cant transfers from rich to poor, since trans-
fer payments might be the price of political consent. 60 
 The baseline problem is especially challenging for public goods such as 
national defence, police protection and the legal system that are fundamental to 
political order. For these goods, the modern benefi ts principle puts few constraints 
on tax policy, and the classical benefi ts principle is diffi cult to interpret. Here, 
the modern principle gives some reason to prefer progressive taxation, while the 
classical principle is more consistent with proportionate taxation. If one accepts 
the classical principle, taxes to support these public goods should probably be 
apportioned on the basis of the taxpayer ’ s economic standing through some 
mixture of income, consumption and property taxes. If one accepts the modern 
benefi ts principle, it seems plausible to support such goods on the basis of 
sharply progressive taxation. Aside from egalitarian distributional preferences, 
there is a plausible argument that the unanimity rule will tend in a progressive 
direction since poor taxpayers have less to lose from the breakdown of politi-
cal order and may more plausibly threaten to veto such spending projects than 
wealthy taxpayers. The implications of benefi ts taxation to support goods that 
are not essential to the political system are slightly more straightforward and 
here Wicksellian taxation would have more predictable results. 
 A second baseline problem concerns the point in time at which costs and 
benefi ts are to be measured. This is a particular problem for social insurance 
programmes that redistribute costs and benefi ts over a taxpayer ’ s life and 
provide insurance against poor outcomes or, in the case of state pensions, good 
outcomes. The diffi culty is that the point of these programmes is in part to 
mitigate risks by redistributing ex post. 61 Social insurance programmes work 
by pooling risks, by transferring resources from the lucky (the employed, the 
healthy, the able-bodied, etc) to the unlucky (the unemployed, the unhealthy, 
the disabled, etc). Part of the value of the social welfare state is that it provides 
benefi ts in the case of misfortune that most taxpayers will not need to use. 
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Another function of the social welfare state is to help manage mismatches in 
income and needs over a person ’ s life. Programmes such as state-funded educa-
tion, childcare subsidies and old age pensions respond to the problem of variable 
income over one ’ s life-cycle and uncertainty about future costs during low-
income periods by allowing citizens to pay into programmes when they have 
suffi cient income, and to collect benefi ts when they have particular needs. 
 The dilemma faced by proponents of the benefi ts principle is that the more 
they appeal to the benefi ts received by an actual taxpayer, the less scope there is for 
social insurance, while the more they appeal to benefi ts received by hypothetical 
taxpayers, the less the theory speaks to the benefi ts received by actual taxpayers. 
For programmes that mitigate risk over the life cycle, it is probably best to assess 
matters from the perspective of a young adult. This refl ects exposure to various 
risks that a person faces over the course of their life but does not abstract away 
from many of the personal characteristics that determine their particular prefer-
ences. The insurance element of social programmes is more diffi cult to analyse. 
The value of insurance, especially for events that are diffi cult to insure on the 
private market, is considerable. This suggests that a taxpayer who pays slightly 
more in taxes than she expects to receive in social insurance benefi ts may still be 
advantaged by the social welfare state. It is diffi cult, however, to decide how to 
value the risks mitigated by social insurance. Some taxpayers are at greater risk of 
unemployment than others. Some taxpayers are more likely to be sick; others are 
more likely to outlive the numbers on actuarial tables. These risks are partially, but 
not entirely, understood ex ante. Children have actuarially different prospects from 
birth if we are told the identity of their parents. By the time that they are adults, 
even more information about their life prospects is available. In some cases  – 
national health insurance that covers medical costs for those in poor health, and 
old age pensions that disproportionately benefi t the healthy and long-lived  – 
benefi ts from social programmes may be offsetting since the chronically ill are less 
likely to collect pensions. But in other cases, the same relatively small number of 
people tend to draw benefi ts from multiple programmes. To the extent that these 
benefi t recipients are identifi able ex ante, this tends to undermine the insurance 
value of social welfare programmes for other taxpayers. 
 The classical benefi ts principle might fi nesse this issue by making benefi ts 
proportional to contributions but compressing the payments schedule so that 
high contributors are somewhat underpaid relative to the value of their contri-
butions, and low contributors are somewhat overpaid. This would preserve the 
proportionality that the principle requires, while allowing for some degree of 
redistribution to be built into the social insurance scheme. This strategy is less 
compatible with the modern principle. At any but a low level of redistribu-
tion, the most advantaged citizens will make contributions that are greater than 
their expected benefi ts. The very wealthy can self-insure against bad outcomes. 
When social insurance contributions become high enough, insurance on private 
markets becomes competitive with government benefi ts for high earners, even 
when taking into account market failures in private insurance. 
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 The baseline problem is not necessarily fatal to benefi ts taxation. But it does 
undermine one of its purported advantages. Although benefi ts taxation requires 
a thicker informational base than ability to pay taxation, it does not appear to 
require analysts to look beyond taxation and public spending to evaluate tax 
fairness. However, the baseline problem suggests that evaluation of the benefi ts 
of the minimal state is bound up in thorny questions about the correct way to 
model a taxpayer ’ s willingness to pay for essential services. The value of social 
insurance programmes to taxpayers crucially depends on how we model the 
risks that they mitigate. Both of these inquiries implicate deep questions about 
distributive justice. This is not necessarily a disadvantage for benefi ts taxation, 
as being embedded in a larger theory of distributive justice might make the 
approach to tax fairness more rather than less plausible. But it does mean that 
benefi ts taxation may have less appeal as a freestanding theory of tax fairness 
and must be considered as one part of a larger theory of fair terms of political 
cooperation. 
 The Public-Spirited Citizen Problem 
 A second problem with benefi ts taxation is that it may be unfair to public-spirited 
citizens. To simplify matters, suppose that there are two types of taxpayers: 
public-spirited taxpayers, and taxpayers who are not public-spirited. 62 Public-
spirited taxpayers care both about their private projects and about collective 
projects that do not directly infl uence their own well-being. This might be 
because they are nationalists who intrinsically care about the status of their 
nation, or because they are altruists who care about the welfare of their fellow 
citizens. Non-public-spirited taxpayers are concerned only with their private 
projects and care about the nation only insofar as its condition affects these 
private projects. Both types of taxpayers are willing to contribute to public 
goods. But their preferences for public goods and their willingness to pay for 
them will differ signifi cantly. Public-spirited and non-public-spirited taxpay-
ers are each willing to pay to support public goods that support their private 
projects. But public-spirited taxpayers are additionally willing to pay taxes 
beyond those necessary for their private projects in order to support projects 
that benefi t the nation as a whole or benefi t their fellow-citizens as individu-
als. Because of their greater willingness to pay for public goods, public-spirited 
taxpayers are likely to assume a somewhat greater proportion of the tax burden 
in a Wicksellian tax system. Under a Wicksell tax system, the public-spirited 
essentially purchase greater provision of public goods through their own taxes 
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that benefi t public-spirited and non-public-spirited alike. Public-spirited citi-
zens might object that this is unfair. They are no more benefi ted in their private 
projects than non-public-spirited citizens are. But because non-public-spirited 
do not intrinsically care about anything outside of their private projects, they 
bear a smaller share of the tax burden. Public-spirited citizens might also object 
that they are being disadvantaged precisely because of their good moral char-
acter. This may sometimes be so. It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
taxpayers could be public-spirited for a variety of reasons, some of which may be 
rather unsavoury. Zealous militarists who favour higher taxes to support foreign 
wars for the greater glory of the nation are no less public-spirited in the sense 
intended here than wealthy taxpayers who favour higher taxes to feed the poor. 
 One response to this problem for Wicksellians is to dig in and insist that 
there is nothing improper with taxing citizens according to their marginal bene-
fi t. As already noted, this is the approach favoured by Wicksell himself. 63 They 
might suggest that a compromise between the preferences of public-spirited and 
non-public-spirited taxpayers is a sign of a fair procedure. This, however, is not 
really responsive to the public-spirited taxpayer ’ s complaint. The objection here 
is that the compromise is not fair because the preferences of public-spirited and 
non-public-spirited taxpayers are different in kind, such that aggregating across 
them benefi ts the selfi sh. 
 An alternative response is to differentiate between self-interested and other 
regarding preferences for the purposes of calculating willingness to pay for 
public goods. Taxes could then be apportioned using self-interested preferences. 
This response, however, tends to exacerbate the diffi culties in measuring benefi ts 
as even procedures that identify willingness to pay will not be enough to distin-
guish between self-regarding and other regarding preferences. A third approach 
would be to fi x the supply of public goods independently of tax obligations so 
that this compromise between taxpayers would not be infected by the differ-
ences in public-spiritedness among taxpayers. Taxes could then be apportioned 
on the basis of private valuations of these public goods, rather than all-things-
considered willingness to pay. This response is similar to that favoured by 
proponents of the classical benefi ts principle. But it would sacrifi ce many of the 
effi ciency gains of the unanimity rule because the supply of public goods would 
no longer be determined by the willingness to pay of individual taxpayers. 
 The public-spirited citizen problem is, in a sense, a reworking of the venera-
ble criticism that benefi ts taxation misunderstands the difference between public 
and private consumption and is therefore inappropriate for analysis of the public 
sector. The critique is subtler than the nineteenth-century version. The point 
here is not that demand for public goods cannot be modelled by analogy to 
private consumption, but that treating altruistic and self-directed preferences as 
120 Ira K Lindsay
equivalent is unfair to those who are altruistic or collectivist. Ironically, it is the 
classical version of the benefi ts principle, which looks to private benefi t, rather 
than the modern principle, which looks to willingness to pay, that is better able 
to respond to this criticism. 
 CONCLUSION 
 After nearly a century of being confi ned to the margins of tax theory, benefi ts 
taxation is almost certainly underrated today. Its advantages are several. First, 
the benefi ts principle provides a way to analyse the relationship between prop-
erty rights and tax burdens that avoids the Scylla of concluding that all taxes 
are a prima facie violation of property rights, and the Charybdis of conceding 
that commitment to private ownership of resources puts no constraints on tax 
policy. Benefi ts taxation places limits on the tax burdens that may be imposed 
on a taxpayer and the permissible scope of redistribution across taxpayers while 
leaving open a range of policies that provide suffi cient benefi ts to each taxpayer. 
Second, the benefi ts theory situates tax fairness in the context of deeper norms 
of reciprocity. This has the theoretical advantage of providing a normative 
foundation for norms of tax fairness and the practical advantage of identifying 
policies more likely to elicit voluntary compliance from taxpayers and political 
support from voters. Third, the modern approach to benefi ts taxation prom-
ises to realise effi ciencies in the provision of public goods that were previously 
thought possible only in private markets. 
 The traditional objections to benefi ts taxation, that it involves appeal to 
unmeasurable quantities and that it is regressive, have some weight but are not 
dispositive. As a normative standard, willingness to pay is conceptually clear 
and may be estimated at least approximately using a variety of techniques. 
Even when benefi ts are diffi cult to measure, the benefi ts principle may suggest 
an alternative justifi cation for taxes on income, consumption, or wealth. 
A second objection  – that the benefi ts principle is regressive  – is only effective 
against certain interpretations of the benefi ts principle. Both of these objec-
tions, however, are connected to a deeper problem, which is that the baseline 
against which willingness to pay is to be measured cannot be made precise with-
out making a host of controversial normative judgments. A third objection, that 
the benefi ts principle is inconsistent with the proper relationship between citizen 
and government runs the risk of treating citizens as serving the state, rather than 
the state as serving citizens. But a related critique has more force. Modern bene-
fi ts theory may tend to treat altruistic taxpayers unfairly and advantage those 
who care largely about their private projects. 
 The classic benefi ts principle and the modern principle have different 
strengths and weaknesses. Both principles help to mediate the confl ict between 
property rights and taxation authority, but do so in slightly different ways. The 
modern principle promises greater effi ciency and an elegant solution to the 
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measurement problem, but is diffi cult to implement in practice. The classical 
principle better tracks plausible norms of fair cooperation but is more vulner-
able to the measurement objection and less well calibrated to produce effi cient 
provision of public goods. The classical benefi ts principle is better suited to 
evaluate taxes in support of public goods that are likely to be supported for 
altruistic reasons. Wicksell taxation, by contrast, is better suited to evaluate 
taxes to support public goods that are similar in character to private consump-
tion goods. 
 The case for the benefi ts principle is not straightforward. But neither is the 
case for any of its competitors. At the very least, benefi ts taxation is a plausible 
rival to  ‘ ability to pay ’ theories. In light of the diffi culties with each version 
of benefi ts taxation, it is probably not desirable to adopt a single principle to 
justify the fi scal system as a whole. What may be more promising instead is a 
modular approach in which different types of taxes are levied to support differ-
ent sorts of spending programmes. Each part of such a fi scal system might be 
justifi ed by the classical benefi ts principle or by the modern benefi ts principle or 
by purely distributive aims, but no single principle of tax fairness would explain 
the system as a whole. 
 

